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Essay
A New Proposal for Loan Modifications
Christopher Mayer,t Edward Morrisont" & Tomasz Piskorskitt*
We propose a new three-prongedplan to address the recent harmfulflood
offoreclosures. Ourplan would address the major barriersthat inhibit the
ability of third-partyservicers to modify mortgages the way portfolio lenders
are now doing with greatersuccess. The plan provides greatercompensation
for servicers to perform their duties, removes legal constraints that inhibit
modification, and addressescriticalsecond liens that often get in the way of
effective mortgage modifications. Our plan has more modest costs than
competingplans and is likely to be the most effective while stillprotecting the
rights of investors in mortgage-backedsecurities.
Introduction
The recent flood of foreclosures has reached crisis levels, with 2.25
million foreclosures started last year I and 1.7 million foreclosures projected to
start in 2009.2 Foreclosures contribute to falling house prices and deteriorating
communities. Policymakers have struggled to stem this rising tide. Despite
good intentions and appreciable effort, public policy that encourages writedowns or other loan modifications by servicers has had limited success.
We offer a new approach to foreclosure prevention that focuses on what
has been the most intractable part of the foreclosure problem: the behavior of
third-party servicers who manage portfolios of securitized mortgages.
Securitized subprime, alt-A, and prime/jumbo loans accounted for more than
one-half of foreclosure starts in 2008 despite representing about fifteen percent
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of all outstanding mortgages. 3 While Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), and the largest private banks and portfolio
lenders have announced their own aggressive programs to pursue mortgage
modification, servicers of securitized mortgages lag behind.
We must act quickly to address the foreclosure problem among
securitized mortgages because the forecast for 2009 is even bleaker. As of
October 2008, more than one-third of the 2.8 million outstanding securitized
subprime loans and seventeen percent of the 2.2 million securitized alt-A loans
were sixty days or more delinquent. 4 And many alt-A option Adjustable Rate
Mortgages (ARMs) 5 will hit their negative amortization limits between 2009
and 2011, resulting in rising payments and likely much higher default rates.
Rumors suggest that some smaller servicers will soon face bankruptcy.
Our approach builds on recent research by Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru,
and Vikrant Vig showing that portfolio lenders-lenders who service loans that
they own-are significantly more successful in stemming foreclosures than

third-party servicers, who service loans owned by other parties. 6 The
researchers show that portfolio lenders achieve foreclosure rates that are
nineteen to thirty-three percent lower than the rates experienced by third-party

servicers.
Third-party servicers face three principal barriers that prevent them from
pursuing mortgage modifications even when they make economic sense.7 First,

old contracts did not anticipate the extent of the current crisis. Mortgage
servicers are not compensated appropriately to handle the current volume of
delinquencies. As well, servicers have too few incentives to pursue loan

modification instead of foreclosure, even when modification makes good
economic sense for investors. Most securitization agreements compensate
servicers for costs incurred during the foreclosure process, but not for expenses
associated with loan modification. Even if modification is successful, it
typically does not generate sufficient fees to cover the costs of modification.
3
According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, about 1.64 million loans started the
foreclosure process as of the third quarter of 2008. Our calculations from Blackbox Logic, LLC data
show that about 900,000 securitized loans began the foreclosure process as of October 2008.
4
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Credit Conditions in the United States,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/regional/subprime.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009) (select "Subprime"
spreadsheet under "United States Mortgage Conditions" for subprime statistics and the "Alt-A"
spreadsheet under "United States Mortgage Conditions" for Alt-A statistics).
5
An option ARM is typically a 30-year ARM that offers the borrower a choice of monthly
payment amounts, including the option to make a minimum payment that is less than the accruing
interest. If borrowers choose to make this minimum payment, there is "negative amortization," which
means that the unpaid portion of the accruing interest is added to the outstanding principal balance.
These mortgages typically have a limit to the amount of negative amortization, at which point the
minimum required payment can rise rapidly.
6
Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Securitization and Distressed Loan
Renegotiation:Evidencefrom the SubprimeMortgage Crisis (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus. Research
Paper No. 09-02, 2008), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1321646.
7
For a useful survey, see Anna Gelpern & Adam Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts:
Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l 323546.
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Consequently, servicers often choose to foreclose, even when modification
would be more profitable for borrowers and investors.
Second, servicers face explicit and implicit legal barriers to modifying
mortgages successfully. Many pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) place
explicit limits on loan modifications. In other cases, vague provisions in the
PSAs, and the consequent threat of lawsuits, serve to limit servicers' ability to
modify loans successfully.
Finally, second liens can be a barrier to successful modifications of first
mortgages. Modification of the first mortgage might yield greater recovery to
first-mortgage lenders than a foreclosure. But there is little incentive to modify
the first mortgage unless second-lien lenders agree to relinquish their claims.
Otherwise, a modification of the first mortgage will just allow the borrower to
allocate more of her income to the second lien. Even if the first mortgage
exceeds the home's expected foreclosure value-implying zero recovery to the
second-lien lenders in foreclosure-the second-lien holder has no incentive to
agree to a modification that extinguishes the second lien. As long as there is
some uncertainty surrounding foreclosure value, no matter how small, the
second-lien holder will prefer foreclosure to loan modification. As well, by
delaying, the second-lien lender might convince the first-mortgage servicer to
"buy out" the second lien at a price above its true value. This is often called a
"hold-up" problem.
These barriers could be overcome if investors agreed to rewrite their
PSAs. A rewrite typically requires unanimous investor consent, especially if it
would give servicers freedom to reduce principal or interest rates. However, the
typical mortgage pool has issued many securities in as many as a dozen or more
tranches, which have different priorities with respect to interest or principal, or
both. The number of investors is so large-and their interests are so
divergent-that consensus is a near impossibility. Put differently, mortgage
securitization has dramatically increased the number of creditors to whom a
homeowner is indebted. The typical securitization has as many creditors, and as
complicated a capital structure, as many large corporations. No one is surprised
when a distressed corporation-whether a small business or General Motorsis unable to convince creditors to rewrite their debt contracts. There are too
many creditors with divergent interests. This is why we have Chapter 11, which
gives corporations power to rewrite contracts. Today, securitizations face
precisely the same problem as General Motors: there is no way (at reasonable
cost) to reach a consensus among creditors. Homeowners bear the
consequences of this standstill.
This is why government intervention is needed. We propose three steps to
get around the barriers to successful loan modification: (1) an Incentive Fee
structure that increases payments to servicers and better aligns their incentives
with investors; (2) another set of Incentive Fees that encourage second-lien
lenders to relinquish their claims when modification of the primary mortgage is
optimal; and (3) a legislative proposal that removes explicit barriers to
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modification in PSAs and that reduces the litigation exposure of servicers who
do modify loans.
Our proposal will prevent as many as one million foreclosures among
privately securitized mortgages. In addition, by reducing hold-up by secondlien lenders, our proposal facilitates hundreds of thousands of modifications
among mortgages controlled by Fannie, Freddie, and the FHA (the
government-sponsored enterprises or GSEs), as well as those controlled by
portfolio lenders. The total cost of our program would be no more than $12.35
billion, which can be funded by the U.S. Treasury's Troubled Assets Relief
Program (TARP).
Other proposals do not address the barriers that servicers face. As well,
our proposal would cost taxpayers considerably less money than other
programs currently under consideration, with no requirement to provide costly
loan guarantees. Losses for bad loans remain with private investors rather than
taxpayers.
Below we describe our approach in more detail. A complete Proposal is
available online. 8 We put forward this Proposal on January 7, 2009. Since then,
elements of it have become part of federal law and policy. Variants of our
proposed Incentive Fees are now part of President Obama's "Making Home
Affordable Program." 9And a safe harbor became part of federal law on May 20,
2009.10
I. Our Proposal in Detail
A. Servicer Incentive Fees
We believe that servicers need greater resources and stronger incentives to
modify loans. We propose that servicers of privately securitized mortgages be
paid a monthly Incentive Fee equal to ten percent of all mortgage payments
made by borrowers, with a cap for each mortgage of $60 per month ($720 per
year). The servicer would also receive a one-time payment equal to twelve
times the previous month's Incentive Fee if the borrower prepays the mortgage.
These payments would be in addition to the normal servicing fees as specified
by the PSA. The program would be limited to any securitized mortgage that is
below the conforming loan limit at the origination date. We estimate that
Incentive Fees would total about $9 billion." The Incentive Fees should remain

8
Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski, A New Proposal for Loan
Mortgage
Market
Proposals
(2009),
Modifications,
Real
Estate:
Full
[hereinafter
http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/realestate/research/housingcrisis/mortgagemarket
Online Proposal].
9
For more information about the program, see Road to Stability, Making Home Affordable,
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/homeowner.html (last visited June 5, 2009).
10
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 § 201, Pub. L. No. 111-22 (2009).
11
See Mayer et al., supra note 8, at app. 2.
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in place for a period of three years, after which improvements in the economy
will likely reduce the need for the incentive program.
Our Incentive Fee program would substantially encourage servicers to
modify mortgages. Servicing fees would now more than cover the direct costs
of modifications, estimated to be as much as $750 to $1000.12 Equally
important, the Incentive Fee program better aligns servicers' interests with
those of investors by giving them a percentage of all cash flow. By paying an
Incentive Fee only when borrowers make payments, we reward successful
modifications. A servicer whose loan modifications are unsuccessful and result
in a quick re-default would collect few Incentive Fees.' 3 Our proposal,
therefore, rewards servicers for keeping future payments as high as possible
without putting the homeowner in a position where he or she is likely to redefault soon after modification. This is exactly the tension that a portfolio
lender addresses in its own loans. Of course, there will still be circumstances in
which costly foreclosure will be unavoidable, but the Incentive Fee will
encourage servicers to look for other options.
Our proposal also encourages short sales if they make economic sense. If
a borrower prepays a mortgage for any reason, the servicer would receive a
one-time Incentive Fee equal to twelve times the previous month's Incentive
Fee. A prepayment could occur for two reasons: the borrower may refinance
the mortgage, or he or she may pursue a short sale (selling the property and
turning over the proceeds to the lender, often in full satisfaction of the
mortgage debt). The one-year Incentive Fee encourages a lender to accept a
short sale when the alternative is a more expensive foreclosure. The lump sum
Incentive Fee also ensures that loan modification costs are covered for
borrowers who eventually prepay.
Importantly, our Incentive Fee program would apply only to securitized
mortgages that fell below the conforming loan limit in the year in which the
loan was originated. So-called jumbo mortgages do not face the same incentive
problems as subprime and alt-A mortgages with lower loan balances. Because
the average mortgage balance exceeds $500,000, servicers receive much
greater financial benefits when they modify a jumbo mortgage. Keeping a
jumbo mortgage in the securitized pool instead of foreclosing can result in
annual payments of $1250 or more, enough to justify substantial effort, if
necessary, to modify a troubled mortgage. As well, the volume of jumbo
mortgage defaults is lower, enabling servicers to give these loans more
attention. Servicers of jumbo loans, however, would still see substantial
benefits from other parts of our proposal.

12

See, e.g., BARCLAYS CAPITAL, 2008 GLOBAL SECURITIZATION ANNUAL 14.

13
Evidence suggests that, among loan modifications performed during the first quarter of
2008, more than one-half re-defaulted within six months. It is therefore important only to reward
servicers for pursuing successful loan modifications. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY,
OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF
NATIONAL BANK AND FEDERAL THRIFT MORTGAGE LOAN DATA, THIRD QUARTER 2008, at 5 (2008),

http://files.ots.treas.gov/482028.pdf.
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Finally, our proposal changes the economics of mortgage servicing from
being a loss leader to a profitable business: it becomes a profitable business
instead of a loss leader. By doing so, we substantially reduce the likelihood of
highly disruptive bankruptcies among smaller, so-called monoline servicers,
who now manage about one-third of all securitized mortgages. We also relax
the liquidity constraints faced by smaller servicers, who now are barely able to
cover the costs of a substantial mortgage modification program. As well, by
making mortgage servicing profitable, we encourage larger servicers to
purchase smaller servicers. Such consolidation could provide important
economic benefits. There are substantial economies of scale in mortgage
servicing, particularly given the large fixed costs and the benefits from learning
in pursuing mortgage modification.
B. Second Lien Incentive Fees
We propose compensating second-lien lenders who voluntarily surrender
their mortgages in order to permit modification by first-mortgage servicers. If a
first-mortgage servicer proposes a loan modification and, in response, the
second-lien servicer relinquishes its claims against the home and the borrower,
the second-lien lender will receive payment equal to five percent of the
outstanding second-lien balance, with payment not to exceed $1500 per
property. If multiple second liens exist, this payment will be split among the
liens.
In order to limit taxpayer costs, and focus primarily on foreclosure
prevention, the Incentive Fee will be available only to a second-lien lender that
relinquishes its claims in response to a decision by a first-mortgage servicer to
conduct a significant modification of the primary mortgage, reducing the
borrower's monthly payments by at least ten percent. This program will apply
only to primary residences subject to first and second liens that are held by
different lenders. Finally, our proposal will apply to all second liens, because
the hold-up problem applies beyond just privately securitized mortgages.
C. A Litigation Safe Harbor
We propose two kinds of legislated changes to PSAs. First, Congress
should enact legislation that eliminates explicit limits on modification,
including both outright prohibitions and provisions that constrain the range of
permissible modifications. The legislation should be temporary, lasting only
three years. Second, Congress should create a "litigation safe harbor" that
insulates servicers from costly litigation, provided they modify loans (or
surrender second liens) in a reasonable, good faith belief that they are acting in
the best interests of investors as a group. The safe harbor is an affirmative
defense, which servicers can assert in the event of litigation. Importantly, the
defense is based on evidence regarding the servicer's reasonable expectations,
not on evidence that the modification was in fact successful or not. If investors
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bring suit, but a servicer successfully invokes the safe harbor, the investors will
pay the servicer's actual legal costs, including attorney and expert-witness fees.
Most PSAs do not explicitly limit modifications, but instead contain
vague language that can paralyze servicers. With respect to these
securitizations, our proposal can best be viewed as clarifying the interpretation
of the PSAs. For example, the typical PSA advises the servicer to act in the
"best interests" of the securitization trust. Yet the contracts do not specify what
counts as "best interests." Modification could reduce the cash-flow rights of
some investors, particularly junior-tranche investors, relative to foreclosure.
These investors can often expect a share of coupon payments during the
foreclosure process, which can last eighteen months. Modification might
eliminate these cash-flow rights. Indeed, some junior-tranche holders have sued
servicers that actively pursue modifications. Our Legislative Proposal (1)
clarifies that servicers' primary duty is to act in the economic interest of
investors as a group and (2) provides protection against lawsuits when the
servicer can show that its actions were consistent with this duty.
Our Legislative Proposal is slightly more complicated for the minority of
PSAs that contain explicit provisions barring modifications. These provisions
can include outright prohibitions on modification, caps on the number of
mortgages that can be modified (for example, five percent of the pool), limits
on the frequency of modifications (for example, no more than once during a
twelve month period), limits on the range of permissible modifications (e.g.,
the modified interest rate cannot fall below a set floor), and requirements that a
servicer purchase any modified loans-at par value-from the securitization
trust. Our proposal will abrogate provisions like these. It is important to note,
however, that our legislation enables modification only when it increases
overall investor value. To be sure, some junior-tranche holders might be
harmed. But this effect likely raises no constitutional concerns, as we explain
below. Moreover, we believe that our proposal makes sense given the
economic crisis we are facing in the housing market. The benefits from
modification far outweigh the burdens on a small class of investors.
Nonetheless, we believe that policymakers should provide compensation to
investors who suffer economic losses. Note, however, that compensation to
junior-tranche investors will be necessary only when legislation abrogates
contractual provisions that would have guaranteed, absent abrogation, cashflow rights to these investors. We estimate that this compensation would cost
about $1.7 billion.
Investors will, however, need information about modifications in order to
assess their reasonability. Our proposal therefore requires servicers to make
public the details of any modification. This reporting requirement will not only
help investors understand and evaluate modifications, but will also provide
useful information to other servicers and lenders, who can study previous
modifications, assess what works and what does not, and thereby develop
successful standards for the future.
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D. Costs and Benefits
Our program will avert more than one million foreclosures at a cost of
$12.35 billion. Among privately securitized mortgages, Incentive Fees will
avoid between 675,000 and one million foreclosures at a cost of about $9
billion, or $10.7 billion if we include compensation to junior-tranche investors.
Incentive Fees for second liens will cost approximately $1.65 billion and
facilitate hundreds of thousands of modifications, both among privately
securitized mortgages
and among mortgages controlled by the GSEs and
14
private lenders.

E. ConstitutionalAnalysis
Because the securitization market crosses state lines and has a major
impact on interstate commerce, Congress has authority under the Commerce
and Spending Clauses to enact the proposed legislation. But because the
legislation alters the terms of existing contracts, it raises other constitutional
15
concerns. The most important is that our proposal might violate the Takings
and Due Process 16 Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, because it abrogates vested
contractual rights.
The Takings Clause prohibits the federal government from taking private
property for public use without just compensation. The Clause "is designed not
to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure conpensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to
a taking." Even assuming our legislative proposal amounts to a taking, it is
not an unconstitutional taking because investors are compensated, in kind, for
the legislative interference. Servicers will be given discretion to modify loans
(or surrender second liens) and incentive to do so only when it improves
payments to investors as a group. Relative to foreclosure, modification will
only increase expected returns to investors. Supreme Court caselaw makes
clear that no taking occurs when a government policy causes no economic
loss.' That will be the case for most investors here. Put differently, our
Legislative Proposal makes securitized mortgages more valuable to investors.
Although it impairs property rights, it impairs rights that are-in the current
environment-destroying value.
To be sure, some investors may suffer a reduction in expected payoffs.
This is most likely to be true for junior-tranche investors, who are often entitled

14
For a detailed cost-benefit analysis, see Full Online Proposal, supra note 8, apps. 2 & 4.
15
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
16
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of... property, without due
process of law ... ").
17
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37 (2005) (quoting First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)).
18
Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
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to a share of coupon payments during the foreclosure process, which can last
eighteen months. Because it avoids the lengthy foreclosure process, loan
modification will eliminate the investors' rights to these payments. This
deprivation, however, is not an unconstitutional taking. Investors are losing
contractual rights-a share of coupon payments, set by contract-not real
property rights. Different rules ("regulatory takings") apply to the former
rights. Most importantly, with respect to our proposal, the Supreme Court has
emphasized repeatedly that the subject matter of almost every contract is
susceptible to government regulation.19 Therefore, any party to a contract is or
should be aware that future government regulation could reduce the value of
contractual rights. Here, the securitization contracts give investors interests in
mortgages. The market for mortgage loans, as noted above, is one that
Congress can regulate. If the government uses regulation to take contractual
rights for its own benefit, a takings issue could arise. 2 1 But that is not the case
here: our proposal nullifies some contractual rights in order to avert premature
foreclosures. The direct beneficiaries are homeowners, investors, and servicers,
not the federal government. 22 Nonetheless, we propose compensation to
aggrieved investors-with compensation delivered by an administrative
agency-to eliminate lingering constitutional doubts, smooth the modification
process, and ensure a quick resolution of the crisis.
For similar reasons, there is no violation of the Due Process Clause. The
standard test for assessing the constitutionality of economic and social
legislation-that it must bear a "rational relationship" to a legitimate
governmental objective 23 -is notoriously lenient 24 and easily met here. First,
our proposal serves a legitimate state interest-minimizing the foreclosure
crisis. Second, it is rational response to the crisis. Our proposal offers a
temporary, incentive-based program that encourages modifications that serve
the best interests of investors. Although contract rights are curtailed, most
investors will benefit. If they are harmed, our program offers compensation.

19
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223-24 (1986) (quoting Norman v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co.,
294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935)); see also Gelpem & Levitin, supra note 7 (discussing Supreme Court case
law upholding federal legislation that invalidated gold clauses in private contracts).
20
See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28 (1992); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223-24 (1986).
21
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224.
22
Additionally, our legislative proposal would abrogate a relatively minor provision (the right
to coupon payments during the foreclosure process) in contracts between securitization trusts and juniortranche investors. Because our proposal does not destroy all of the investors' contractual rights, it is
unlikely to be viewed as a taking. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,131 (1978).
23
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Romein, 503 U.S. 181,191 (1992); Exxon Corp. v. Governor ofMd., 437 U.S. 117, 124-125 (1978).
24
See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
25
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
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II. Alternative Proposals
Alternative proposals generally fall into four categories: (1) allowing
judges to modify mortgages and "cram down" principal amounts in bankruptcy;
(2) making explicit payments or offering loan guarantees to servicers on all
mortgages that they modify; (3) allowing homeowners to take on second liens
from the government, with personal liability for the loan balances; and (4)
appointing blind trustees to administer loan modifications in place of servicers.
A. Bankruptcy Cramdown
Proponents of bankruptcy reform believe it would impose no (or minimal)
costs on taxpayers. That is untrue. Cramdown may be no more costly than
doing nothing about the foreclosure crisis, but doing nothing is not the only
alternative. Relative to our proposal, cramdown exposes taxpayers to
significant losses.
First, cramdown would likely apply to all mortgages, including the 35
million outstanding mortgages (over $5.5 trillion in value) guaranteed by
Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and the FHA. The government can already ensure
fair modifications for these mortgages, which represent about seventy percent
of all mortgages. Cramdown could pit federal judges against the GSEs.
Second, cramdown would likely impose excessive losses on lenders.
Judges would routinely reduce a homeowner's principal balance to the current
appraised value of the home. This kind of mortgage modification is far more
aggressive than the strategies now being developed by lenders. Some strategies,
such as forbearance, do not involve principal write-downs at all. The
for reductions in interest rates
FDIC/IndyMac program, for example, provides
26
and forbearance on principal payments. Different modification strategies, in
other words, will be appropriate for different borrowers, in order to
simultaneously avoid foreclosure and minimize losses to lenders. Bankruptcy
cramdown does little to tailor modifications to the needs and abilities of
borrowers. It instead applies a costly, one-size-fits-all approach.
Equally important, once cramdown is an option, it may prevent other
kinds of modifications that are less costly but equally effective. Borrowers may
have little incentive to accept a lender's modification proposal when they can
go to bankruptcy court and have a judge cramdown their principal balances.
When house prices rise again, as they eventually will, the borrower will enjoy
all of this appreciation. Cramdowns will have eliminated the possibility that a
lender can ever recover its losses on borrowing.
Finally, cramdown legislation could prolong the foreclosure crisis and
generate a massive number of bankruptcy filings. Two-thirds of Chapter 13

26
Forbearance reduces the amount of principal to which a lender applies interest when
computing monthly mortgage payments.
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plans fail.27 There is, therefore, a large risk that bankruptcy judges will permit

cramdown in many cases where it is inappropriate: the homeowner will
ultimately default, the Chapter 13 plan will fail, and the home will go through

foreclosure. Cramdown also imposes excessive burdens on bankruptcy judges
and trustees, whose already massive caseload has prompted congressional
hearings. 28 Cramdown could prolong the current crisis for years.
Equally devastating, third-party servicers might find it more attractive to

deal with a homeowner in bankruptcy than to attempt a loan modification
outside of bankruptcy. Proponents argue that bankruptcy reform would give

borrowers a tool to fight back against servicers. Yet, the opposite could be the
case. Servicers might prefer bankruptcy to loan modification for the same
reason that servicers now prefer foreclosure to modification. Under most PSAs,
servicers would likely be able to recover expenses incurred in connection with
a homeowner's bankruptcy filing, just as they now recover expenses incurred in
connection with a foreclosure. There is no reimbursement for costs incurred in
performing a loan modification. This set of incentives could result in millions
of Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings that harm consumer credit and appreciably
delay a resolution of the crisis.

Finally, the cost of future credit could rise significantly, especially for
individuals with imperfect credit records. Empirical evidence suggests that
borrowing costs are higher
and mortgage amounts are smaller when mortgages
29
are subject to cramdown

B. Paymentsfor Mortgage Modification

The FDIC has proposed that the government pay servicers $1000 every
time they modify a loan, and have taxpayers share up to fifty percent of losses
from post-modification default. 30 This proposal shares features with ours.
However, the mortgage guarantee imposes a potentially large burden on

taxpayers instead of investors, and would not appreciably increase the
27
Wenli Li, What Do We Know About Chapter 13 PersonalBankruptcy Filings, FED. RES.
BANK
PHILA.
Bus.
REV.,
Fourth
Quarter
2007,
at
19,
available
at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2007/q4/li-chapter- 13filings.pdf. A Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing is a way for individuals to undergo a financial reorganization
supervised by a federal bankruptcy court. Under Chapter 13, the debtor proposes a plan to pay creditors
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program's effectiveness. It also encourages servicers to "modify" as many
loans as possible, reducing ultimate payments to investors, with no guarantee of
successful modification. Additionally, servicers would still be hamstrung by
existing legal barriers without our "safe harbor" provision.
31
C. Second Liens with PersonalLiability

A third group of proposals suggests that borrowers take on full-recourse
second mortgages to help work out of the crisis. We believe that this alternative
sets a dangerous precedent that would allow homeowners to permanently take
on debts to stay in their homes. Under such a plan, homeowners could
subsequently re-default on their mortgages, be kicked out of their homes, and
face debts that could not be discharged by a court. This scenario resembles
debtor's prison. Given psychological evidence that some consumers have
difficulty weighing the consequences of their decisions, we do not believe that
personal liability is the right solution.
D. Blind Trustee
John Geanakoplos and Susan Koniak have proposed forcing servicers to
transfer troubled mortgages to a government-appointed trustee, who would be
charged with managing the workout and foreclosure process. 32 We believe that
such a plan runs many of the same risks as bankruptcy cramdowns, and could
even be worse for mortgage investors. Local trustees would have no incentive
to maximize payments by the borrower, would be subject to limited oversight,
and-as a result-would be likely to propose plans that are overly generous to
homeowners and impose unnecessary losses on investors and taxpayers. The
trustee might, for example, excessively reduce mortgage payments for a
borrower who has large credit card bills even though the trustee (unlike a
bankruptcy judge) has no power to reduce the credit card debt payments as
well. The Geanakoplos-Koniak plan also has no provisions for dealing with
excessive second liens. Finally, implementing their plan would be timeconsuming and fraught with start-up questions because the plan anoints a fleet
of new trustees with limited experience doing this kind of work.
III.

Conclusion

We are witnessing an unprecedented housing and foreclosure crisis. Two
problems are driving the crisis: (1) legal and economic barriers deter servicers
from modifying privately securitized mortgages and (2) second liens are
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A New Proposal for Loan Modifications
holding up sensible modifications of primary mortgages. We propose a
comprehensive solution to this crisis. First, the government should compensate
servicers who modify mortgages. Second, it should compensate second-lien
lenders who surrender their claims when primary mortgage servicers perform
substantial modifications. Third, the government should remove legal
constraints that now inhibit modification and will continue to inhibit it even if
servicers and second-lien lenders are given appropriate economic incentives.
We estimate that, over the next three years, our plan will prevent nearly
one million foreclosures among privately securitized mortgages and facilitate
hundreds of thousands of modifications among mortgages controlled by GSEs
or portfolio lenders. Our plan would cost no more than $12.35 billion, far less
than competing proposals, and would raise no constitutional concerns.

